The presentation is interesting for a number of reasons (interesting uses of RRDTool for one)...  I didn't know that one of the F root servers was in Ottawa.

Sean

On 2/16/07, John Lange <john.lange@open-it.ca> wrote:
Some on this list may find the following information interesting.

Note that the root name servers are protected by "anycast" and they are
crediting that with resisting the attack.

John

-------- Forwarded Message --------
> From: Sue Graves <Sue_Graves@isc.org>
> To: bind-announce@isc.org
> Subject: ISC Bulletin #1
> Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2007 19:49:41 -0800
>
> This communication is intended for anyone interested in more information
> on the DDoS attack of last week.
>
> As you are probably aware, there was an attack on several of the root
> nameservers early Tuesday morning of last week.  ISC operates
> f.root.servers.net (F-root), one of the 13 root nameservers that was
> targeted.  The attack was a 'distributed denial of service' (DDoS)
> attack, in which attackers tried to disable root DNS service by
> overwhelming the network paths to the root servers with malicious
> packets meant to pass as legitimate DNS traffic.  Overall, root name
> service as provided by F-root was not compromised. The distributed
> F-root architecture includes a mix of global and local anycast nodes.
> The global nodes and the local Asian nodes showed some degradation
> during the first two hours, but others were unaffected. David Knight, of
> ISC's Operations group, made a brief presentation at the North American
> Network Operators' Group (NANOG) conference the next morning. The
> slides, which include some technical detail on the attack, can be found
> at: http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0702/presentations/knight.pdf
>
> ISC began using anycast in a single location in 1998.  Wider deployment
> began in Madrid in 2002.  We're pleased to report that anycast worked
> just as expected.  Anycast deployment helped counter this attack by
> fragmenting it into smaller pieces that were easier to deal with, as
> well as isolating the effects into the area of greatest concentration of
> sources of the attack. This left other regions far from the sources with
> a completely unaltered service. Overall, the increase in aggregated
> network bandwidth, CPU power and service capacity helped make this
> attack non-disruptive for the Internet at large.
>
> As a customer of ISC, you are well aware of our software development
> skills, however, you may not be aware of our additional expertise in DNS
> operations. The F-root nameservers answer over 15,000 queries per second
> globally.  F is deployed at 40 sites in 32 different countries.  Anycast
> makes sense for us, it might make sense for you.  You can learn more
> about F-root at: http://www.isc.org/ops/f-root/.  Specifics about
> anycast can be found at: http://www.isc.org/pubs/tn/?tn=isc-tn-2003-1.html.
>
> You may not be aware that we offer secondary hosting on a best-effort
> basis at no charge to many xxTLD's, ISC customers and non-profits.  If
> you're interested in learning more about whether anycast would be of
> benefit in your network, or in our secondary hosting, please contact us
> at info@isc.org.
>
> If you'd like to learn more about DNS issues on a global
> scale, you should consider OARC (http://public.oarci.net/).  ISC's OARC
> (Operational Analysis and Research Center) played a key supportive role
> during the attack. OARC facilitated a coordinated response via secure
> real-time communications between root and top-level domain server
> operators and other OARC members.
>
> Post-attack, OARC is using its infrastructure and working with members
> to gain understanding of the attack's source and impact. This includes
> uploading data using OARC's DSC and PCAP tools from affected server
> operators to our NSF-funded 4TB data repository. From there it is
> available for analysis by members and the research community, to gain
> further understanding of the causes and how to prevent future such attacks.
>
> OARC membership and resources are open to all large-scale DNS operators,
> implementers, active researchers and law enforcement agencies. OARC also
> provides a number of tools and mailing lists open to DNS operators of
> all types. Please contact OARC Programme Manager Keith Mitchell
> <admin@oarc.isc.org> for more information.


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Sean Walberg < sean@ertw.com>    http://ertw.com/