I'm trying to guess how? In what instance is some program allowing
network vectors to set env vars, especially without sterilization? Or
do I not want to know...
Wonderful, another day, another big bad security hole... or two.
Run your patches!
First up: bash:
$ env x='() { :;}; echo OOPS' bash -c /usr/sbin/nologin
OOPS
This account is currently not available.
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/09/24/10
claims:
> In many common configurations, this vulnerability is exploitable over
> the network.
I'm trying to guess how? In what instance is some program allowing
network vectors to set env vars, especially without sterilization? Or
do I not want to know...
Next up, procmail has a formail buffer overflow that may or may not
allow arb code exec CVE-2014-3618. Many stock procmail recipes use
formail. It's easy to see how this one is remotely exploitable.
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